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This paper provides a critical review of social contextual and group biases that are
relevant to team decision-making in command and control situations. Motivated
by the insuYcient level of attention this area has received, the purpose of the
paper is to provide an insight into the potential that these types of biases have to
aVect the decision-making of such teams. The biases considered are: false
consensus, groupthink, group polarization and group escalation of commitment.
For each bias the following four questions are addressed. What is the descriptive
nature of the bias? What factors induce the bias? What psychological mechanisms
underlie the bias? What is the relevance of the bias to command and control
teams? The analysis suggests that these biases have a strong potential to aVect
team decisions. Consistent with the nature of team decision-making in command
and control situations, all of the biases considered tend to be associated with
those decisions that are important or novel and are promoted by time pressure
and high levels of uncertainty. A concept unifying these biases is that of the
shared mental model, but whereas false consensus emanates from social
projection tendencies, the rest emanate from social in¯ uence factors. The authors
also discuss the t`ricky’ distinction between teams and groups and propose a
revised de® nition for command and control team. Finally, the authors emphasize
the need for future empirical research in this area to pay additional attention to
the social side of cognition and the potential that social biases have to aVect team
decision-making.
1. Introduction
Teams form an important part of most people’s working and social lives. Within the
commercial world eVective teamwork is essential if competitive advantage is to be
achieved. On a wider scale, teams are an integral part of our societal infrastructure,
playing a vital role within the emergency services, the armed forces and
transportation; teams on which thousands of people rely everyday for their well-
being, safety and protection. The complexity of many tasks demands teams of
specialists that are able to eVectively and eYciently implement those tasks. Certain
decision problems and tasks are beyond the scope of an individual, or even a
collection of individuals lacking the distinct characteristics of teams, to either
understand or implement. In short, we need teams. However teams, like any
individual or social unit, are not infallible or immune to error. Such errors can be
*Author for correspondence. e-mail: PE.Jones@psy.vu.nl
ERGONOMICS, 2000, VOL. 43, NO. 8, 1129± 1152
Ergonomics ISSN 0014-0139 print/ISSN 1366-584 7 online Ó 2000 Taylor & Francis Ltd
http://www.tandf.co.uk/journals
costly. For example, Foushee and Helmreich (1988) reported that over 60% of
airline accidents have been attributed to poor crew co-ordination and decision-
making; because of this, we need to understand the processes that underlie team
functioning and the factors that aVect the performance of teams so that team
eVectiveness can be improved. The scale of this challenge begins to become clear
when one recognizes that team performance is a function of numerous related and
parallel team processes including decision-making, communication, co-ordination
and co-operation, each of which may be considered a research domain in its own
right. While team performance accounts for far greater activity than decision-
making alone, eVective decision-making is recognized as being critical for the
accomplishment of team goals. The focus in this paper is on decision-making biases
within teams.
Many diVerent types of biases may aZict teams. As will be discussed later, such
biases emanate from a variety of sources, for example, individual cognitive
limitations, the social context or organizational policy. There are, in addition, many
diVerent types of teams, each with their own features and characteristics, that can be
aVected by these biases. The authors concentrate their eVorts on the important
category of team that operate in command and control situations. Such teams are
widespread and their eVectiveness has important implications for the quality of our
lives and for society in general. Examples of command and control teams include
military units, ® re-® ghting teams, emergency medical teams and cockpit crews. This
paper converges on biases that may emanate from the social context of such teams.
These include social inference biases as well as traditional group biases, both of
which will be addressed. To the extent that both groups and teams consist of
multiple individuals, social contextual and group biases are likely to have important
implications for teams. Moreover, such biases have received relatively little attention
within team decision-making research. This branch of decision research is itself only
beginning to become established within a ® eld that has traditionally been dominated
by research at the individual and group level. However, team research to date is in
turn dominated by a cognitive perspective with relatively little attention being placed
on social cognitive elements. The purpose here is to examine the potential that social
contextual and group biases have for command and control teams.
Since the present aims include assessing the relevance of group biases to teams,
the important distinction between groups and teams is discussed ® rst. This
discussion is then extended by describing how command and control teams diVer
from other types of team. Next, to place the discussion in a wider context, the
authors describe the various categories of bias that may aVect team decision-making,
beginning with a distinction between team error and team bias. In the remainder of
the paper four important social contextual and group biases are extrapolated to
command and control teams. The biases considered are: groupthink, group
polarization, group escalation of commitment and false consensus. These biases
have been widely reported in the literature and together represent a key set of biases
that are likely to have important implications for teams.
2. Teams, groups and command and control
The diVerence between groups and teams is something of a `grey area’ . Any
diVerence is at best not obvious and is not helped by the inconsistency in the
literature on this issue. While some researchers (Orasanu and Salas 1993) do make a
distinction, others (Sundstrom et al. 1990) decline to do so, and regard the terms
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group and team as interchangeable . Johnson and Johnson (1987: 8) de® ne a group as
t`wo or more individuals in face-to-face interaction, each aware of his or her group
membership, each aware of the others who belong to the group, and each aware of
their positive interdependence as they strive to achieve mutual goals’ . According to
this de® nition, one may be justi® ed in concluding that a team is a group. A strict and
satisfactory de® nition of team that distinguishes it from a group is diYcult to ® nd.
More common is for researchers to highlight the diVerences between a group and a
team, or describe the characteristics of a team, as opposed to de® ning team, per se.
Along these lines, Orasanu and Salas (1993: 328) make the following distinction:
`Teams consist of highly diVerentiated and interdependent members; groups, on the
other hand, consist of homogeneous and interchangeable members, like juries’ .
However, this is a polarised view. Indeed, Orasanu and Salas (1993) emphasise that
the most critical feature distinguishing teams from groups is the degree of
diVerentiation of roles or task-relevant knowledge, and the degree of interdepen-
dence. The implication is therefore that group members are merely less diVerentiated
and interdependent than team members. In terms of the de® nition oVered by
Johnson and Johnson (1987), this distinction implies that a team is a special case of a
group. However, while all teams may be considered to be a form of group, the
reverse is not true. For example, a group of women who regularly go dancing on
Friday evenings cannot be considered to be a team.
The distinction between teams and groups may be extended by distinguishing
between group decision-making and team decision-making on the one hand, and
group tasks and team tasks on the other. In groups, decision-making constitutes the
task itself, e.g. the task of deciding whether someone is guilty or innocent, or the task
of deciding where to locate a business. Thus the task of the group is to make a
speci® c decision. Here the problem is one of achieving consensus. On the other hand,
in teams, decision-making is embedded, to varying degrees, with a broader ongoing
task, for example ® re-® ghting, conducting research, management consultancy. Thus
a team makes decisions to accomplish a speci® c task. Here the problem is one of co-
ordination. However, team decision-making can be seen as taking place at two broad
levels: an operational level and a planning/strategic level. Those decisions made at a
strategic level will often closely resemble group decision-making. Thus, the task of
making group decisions may be regarded as a sub-team task. This discussion leads to
an interesting paradox. In terms of the de® nitions and distinctions between teams
and groups that have been oVered, the implication is that teams are a sub-set of
groups. From a decision-making context on the other hand, group decision-making
is a subset of team decision-making. This is a convenient point to leave this issue and
continue with the rest of the discussion.
Having made a distinction between groups and teams, a distinction will now be
made between diVerent types of teams. There are many types of teams, which vary in
their function, their nature and their relationship with the broader organization.
There are also various ways in which teams may be classi® ed. Sundstrom et al. (1990)
have conceptualized teams using two dimensions: diVerentiation of members and
integration within the organizational structure. DiVerentiation refers to the degree of
task specialization, independence and autonomy of team members. Highly
diVerentiated teams require expert, role diVerentiated specialists, for example,
command and control teams, which includes military teams, ® re-® ghting units,
medical emergency teams and cockpit crews. A somewhat diVerent example is a
company’s marketing research team in which there are typically data analysis
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experts, research co-ordinators and ® eld staV. Conversely, examples of low
diVerentiated teams include manufacturing crews and committees, where the team
members are less functionally distinct and more interchangeable. Organizational
integration refers to the degree to which the team activities are central to the goals of
the organization as a whole. Command and control teams and manufacturing are
generally highly integrated whereas committees and marketing research departments
tend to be located on the periphery of the organization, i.e. they are not `what the
organization does’ . Two important aspects that this conceptualization does not
address concern decision-making activities within the team and the central purpose
of using a team to carry out a task. Moreover, the classi® cation is not directed
exclusively at either groups or teams.
An alternative conceptualization that is proposed to complement that of
Sundstrom et al. (1990) uses two diVerent dimensions as the basis for a classi® cation
and is directed speci® cally at teams. The ® rst dimension is the degree to which team
members actively engage in decision-making relevant to the accomplishment of the
task. For example, a naval oYcer in a command and control team may decide that
an approaching aircraft is hostile, or an analyst in a marketing research team may
decide to use a particular method of analysis. On the other hand, members of
manufacturing teams or theatrical teams do not tend to make task-relevant
decisions. The second dimension refers to the extent to which the team is necessary,
as opposed to preferable, for carrying out the task. Some tasks would be clearly
impossible for a single individual to carry out (e.g. naval defence, dramatization of
Shakespeare’s Othello). Other tasks could, in principle, be carried out by a single
individual (e.g. marketing research, manufacturing) ; the output rate per person
would, of course, be disproportionately lower in the case of the s`ole trader’ since
production would be less eYcient, and of course total output capabilities would be
limited to that single individual.
The type of team that forms the focus of this paper is the command and control
team. In the absence of a satisfactory de® nition, the classi® cation of both Sundstrom
et al. (1990) and the present authors may be used to de® ne a command and control
team as two or more individuals with specialist and interdependent roles who are
necessarily brought together to perform a complex decision-rich task in order to
achieve goals that are central to those of the organization. In addition, command
and control teams are typically confronted with ambiguous information from
multiple sources and operate in environments characterized by dynamically changing
task conditions, time pressure and stress compounded by high stakes. To operate
successfully, command and control teams must be well co-ordinated, have the ability
to adapt and to manage internal resources.
3. Types of team biases
The notions of team bias and team error are closely related. Three sources of team
error as proposed by DuVy (1993) are discussed in this section, but ® rst an
interpretation of these two terms will be given. Drawing on Reason’ s (1990)
de® nition of error, it may be inferred that a team decision error refers to those
occasions when the team’s decision-making activities fail to achieve its intended
outcome. A team decision bias, on the other hand, refers to team decision-making
behaviour that deviates from what (existing) normative decision-making models
imply. A bias will not necessarily result in an error but may be responsible for one. A
team bias then, may be regarded as a generic source of team error. DuVy (1993)
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proposed that there are three sources of team error: cognitive, organizational and
social. The authors’ interpretation is that both errors and biases arising within each
of these three sources may lead to a team bias, which in turn may result in a team
error. For example, both a cognitive error and a cognitive bias may result in a team
bias.
Cognitive biases and errors stem from people’s limited information processing
capacity and the consequent reliance on mental simplifying strategies known as
cognitive heuristics. A large proportion of these heuristics concern biases in
probability judgement. Most of these individual biases are relevant to team decision-
making and represent an important source of error not to be overlooked. There is a
substantial literature dealing with cognitive heuristics and biases; for a general
overview see, for example, Hogarth (1987) or Baron (1994) and for a discussion of
cognitive heuristics from a team bias perspective, see DuVy (1993).
Errors and biases emanating from the broader organization are a second source
of bias for teams. For example, Hackman (1988) pointed out that strategic and
planning decisions made at higher levels of the organization might be the most
signi® cant factor governing team performance. The source of many accidents that
have arisen in team environments have been attributed to errors made at a
management level, e.g. the Herald of Free Enterprise disaster in 1987. (An account of
this accident is given in Rearon (1990)). Bruggink (1985) , in an analysis of 23 fatal
aircraft accidents, showed that 65% of them were in¯ uenced by policy factors. DuVy
(1993) also emphasizes the in¯ uence that organizational features (e.g. culture,
structure, design and resources) and the physical working environment may have on
the potential for team bias.
The third source of team error or bias is derived from social interaction and
social contextual factors within the immediate team. Biases occurring at this level are
the focus of this paper. There are two broad categories of bias emanating from this
source. The ® rst is a result of social in¯ uence, which refers to the process by which
individual judgements, behaviour and attitudes change as a result of the real or
implied presence of other people. Traditionally this category has been called group
biases and the authors are speci® cally concerned with how group biases may aVect
the decision behaviour of the team. The second category of error emanating from
social interaction and social contextual factors re¯ ects the need, or the tendency, for
individuals to make assumptions, estimates, or predictions about other team
members. When they do so, the potential for bias re¯ ects people’s tendency to
anchor their estimates of others on their own position. This tendency is known as
social projection. Although not strictly a group bias in the sense that the others are,
social projection has important implications for groups to the extent that people
make estimates about individuals belonging to both their own group and other
groups. Whereas social projection biases may be regarded as non-discussion based,
social in¯ uence biases may be regarded as discussion based. For convenience these
two categories of social bias are labelled collectively as s`ocial contextual and group
biases’ since this consists of terms that are relevant for both categories of bias.
Thus a team bias may have at least three speci® c sources. Most team biases are
unlikely to be attributable exclusively to a single bias from any one category, but
rather be caused by multiple sources and biases involving the interaction of speci® c
environmental events. Although a single bias will frequently only be a contributory
factor, and not the root cause of a team bias, that single bias itself may have emerged
from a long and complex chain of events and decisions. Moreover, the picture is
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further complicated by the possibility of yet unknown biases that are exclusive to
teams. While much more research is required to achieve a better understanding of
team processes, an examination of how known biases may aVect team decision-
making oVers a useful way of gaining a greater insight into the determinants of team
bias. In the remainder of the paper the authors examine the potential of four social
contextual and group biases to aVect team decision-making in command and control
situations.
4. Social contextual and group decision biases in teams
First the potential bias emanating from social projection is addressed. This
phenomenon is likely to arise when team members need to make estimates about
others, either within or outside the immediate team. For example a ® re chief’s
decision may require making an judgement about the future intended actions of
another team member when such information is unavailable or impractical to access,
for instance, owing to time pressure or a failure in the lines of communication. An
important conceptualization of this potential bias is known as false consensus and is
the one that will be examined here. After this, the biases emanating from social
in¯ uential factors are addressed. Such phenomena are likely to be highly in¯ uential
whenever team members engage in discussion as part of a collective, but localized
decision-making process, e.g. on tactical or team management issues. The biases
examined that fall into this category are: groupthink, group polarization and group
escalation of commitment. For each of the four biases there follows, ® rst, a general
discussion explaining the phenomenon and a brief review of the empirical research.
Second, the underlying psychological mechanisms are discussed. Various theories,
theoretical perspectives and hypothesized explanations from the literature are
presented. Third, the conditions that invite or contribute to the bias are examined.
Finally, the relevance of the bias to command and control teams is discussed.
4.1. False consensus
The false consensus eVect (FCE) refers to the tendency to overestimate the degree of
similarity between self and others and may result in biased judgements or decisions.
Ross et al. (1977: 280) ® rst coined the term false consensus and described it as
people’s tendency to s`ee their own behavioural choices and judgements as relatively
common and appropriate to existing circumstances while viewing alternative
responses as uncommon, deviant, or inappropriate ’ . False consensus occurs when
people estimate more support for their own particular position than people holding
an opposing view estimate for that position. Put simply, the FCE is the tendency to
see one’s own behaviour as typical.
In a classic demonstration (Ross et al. 1977), students were asked to walk around
the campus for 30 min wearing a sandwich board that read `Repent’ . Those who
agreed to do so estimated that 63.5% of their fellow students would also agree,
whereas those who refused to do so estimated that only 23.3% would agree (i.e. a
FCE of 40.2% ). Since this study, the FCE has been demonstrated many times across
a wide range of descriptive items covering attitudes, personal preferences, political
expectations and behavioural choices. The potential strength of the FCE is
illustrated in a study by Mullen (1983) who observed the bias among contestants
of a television game even when substantial prizes could be won for accurate
consensus estimates. Moreover, a meta-analysis of 115 tests of the FCE (Mullen et
al. 1985) revealed that the eVect is highly reliable and of moderate magnitude. More
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recently, Krueger (1998) stated that over 90% of all published and unpublished tests
of the false consensus from 1991± 96 showed a signi® cant eVect.
4.1.1. Underlying psychological mechanismsÐ theoretical perspectives of false con-
sensus: As in other social cognitive domains, the possible mechanisms underlying
false consensus fall into two broad, competing categories: cognitive and motiva-
tional. The ® rst four theories considered are cognitive and the ® nal one is
motivational.
The selective exposure and cognitive availability perspective suggests that instances of
similarity or agreement between self and others are often more easily retrieved from
memory than instances of dissimilarity or disagreement. This stems from the general
tendency for people to associate with similar others. As a result, people overestimate
the level of consensus that exists for their own position in the population as a whole
because such judgements are based on the restricted or biased sample to which they
are selectively exposed. For example, Sherman et al. (1983) showed that people’s
estimate of smoking prevalence was smaller for those who associated mainly with
non-smokers than for those who associated mainly with smokers. The ® ndings of
several other studies that have investigated social projection tendencies within the
context of in-groups and out-groups (Holtz and Miller 1985) are also consistent with
this explanation. Moreover, a number of key researchers in the ® eld (Ross et al.
1977, Sherman et al. 1983, Marks and Miller 1987) have suggested that selective
exposure is the primary factor generating the FCE. However, since exposure has
never been directly manipulated, its eVect on cognitive availability and its more
proximate eVect on consensus estimates remains inconclusive.
The notion of availability is invoked in an alternative perspective suggesting that
false consensus is aVected by the salience of particular positions or the focus of
attention on one’s preferred position. For example, Zuckerman et al (1982) showed
that observers perceived salient behavior as more common than nonsalient behavior.
And Marks and Duval (1991) found that subjects perceived more consensus for their
preferred alternative when their attention was more focused on that alternative.
Salience and focus of attention could be attributable to a multitude of factors
although a number of researchers (van der Pligt et al. 1983, Marks and Miller 1985)
have implicated the degree of certainty a person has for a particular position. These
studies suggest that people who are certain about their position are more focused on
that position and are therefore less likely to think about alternatives. However, while
these studies suggest that the level of certainty (and thus the level of salience) is a
suYcient cause for false consensus to occur, Krueger (1998) suggests that salience is
unlikely to be a necessary cause.
DiVerential construal (or resolution of ambiguity) acknowledges the fact that
many social events are poorly de® ned and open to multiple interpretations (GriYn
and Ross 1991). For example, a person’ s estimate of the proportion of people who
enjoy driving would depend on whether that person imagines, for instance, driving
an expensive, open top car along a clear stretch of country road in the summer, or
stuck in rush hour traYc in an unreliable car with a leaky roof during winter. The
research ® ndings from Gilovich (1990) and Bosveld et al. (1996) both suggest that
diVerential construal is capable of explaining FCEs.
The causal attribution perspective emphasizes the perceived nature of the reason
for one’s adopted position as being central to the generation of FCEs. Speci® cally, if
one attributes the cause of one’s position to the object or situation, one may perceive
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a high degree of consensus for it. If, on the other hand, the cause of one’ s position is
attributed to one’s personal disposition, then there may be a lower tendency to
perceive consensus. A somewhat troublesome assumption underlying this perspec-
tive is that for a false consensus to arise from a situational attribution, individuals
must assume that the situation will aVect themselves and others similarly. This is
inconsistent with the common view that people tend to attribute the cause of their
own behaviour to the situation, whereas they generally attribute the cause of others’
behaviour to dispositional factors (Jones and Nisbett 1971). However, the
assumption is more in line with the logical information perspective in which it is
assumed that people perceive themselves and others as rational beings who behave in
similar ways to a speci® c situation. Despite this possibility, there is limited empirical
support for the causal attribution model (two exceptions are Zuckerman and Mann
1979 and Gilovich et al. 1983), suggesting that the theory has limited explanatory
power.
The ® nal view emphasizes the functional value that perceiving consensus may
oVer; that is, perceiving similarity between self and others may be motivated by
personal needs. The ® ndings of numerous studies support a motivational
perspective. Taken together, these studies suggest that assuming similarity with
others may `bolster perceived social support, validate the correctness or appro-
priateness of a position, maintain self esteem, maintain or restore cognitive balance,
or reduce tension associated with anticipated social interaction’ (Marks and Miller
1987: 73). While these motivations provide possible explanations for assuming
similarity with others, a motivational argument could also explain tendencies to
assume dissimilarity. Mullen and Goethals (1990) suggested that people may be
motivated to assume similarity on their negative characteristics (ego-protection) but
to assume dissimilarity on their positive characteristics (ego-enhancement) . How-
ever, Krueger (1998) suggests that the viability of motivational explanations is weak,
pointing to several studies in which FCEs were demonstrated to persist after
controlling for, or ruling out, motivational factors. Moreover, the meta-analyses by
Mullen et al. (1985) and Mullen and Hu (1988) suggest that cognitive mechanisms
are more likely to underlie perceptions of consensus.
More than one theoretical view may account for speci® cally observed FCEs.
Moreover, it is unlikely that any one theoretical perspective is capable of providing a
complete account of FCEs. Indeed, Marks and Miller (1987) suggest that all of the
mechanisms may explain the FCE under certain conditions and that several
mechanisms may operate in parallel at any one time.
4.1.2. Conditions that invite false consensus: The research ® ndings suggest a
number of conditions that invite false consensus. Speci® cally, FCEs are likely to
be stronger in the following situations: when one is selectively exposed to similar
others; when one’s decision behaviour is attributed to situational as opposed to
dispositional factors; when one’s focus is directed towards a single position and not
towards alternatives; when one is highly certain about the correctness of one’s
position (Marks and Miller 1985); when the issue under consideration is important
to the subjects; when comparison is made on opinions as opposed to abilities
(Campbell 1986); when the item being judged involves threat to self, for example,
estimating prevalence of a perceived weakness (Sherman et al. 1984); and ® nally
when positive qualities are involved because people assume that positive others share
their positive qualities (van der Pligt 1984).
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Before discussing the relevance of false consensus to command and control, it is
important to discuss the extent to which the FCE can be regarded as false. The false
consensus paradigm makes the implicit assumption that any FCE signi® cantly
diVerent from zero constitutes a bias. However, to what extent does a FCE really
suggest that people are biased? Two important points need to be made. The ® rst
involves a consideration of the accuracy of consensus estimates, i.e. estimated
consensus minus the actual consensus. The second concerns the underlying
irrationality implied by false consensus.
Recall that the FCE is a relative eVect, computed as the mean percentage
estimate of people who hold position A, say, made by those subjects who
themselves hold position A, minus the mean percentage estimate of people who
hold position A made by those subjects who hold position B. The issue of the
accuracy of the estimates is not explicitly addressed. It is true that a FCE implies
by de® nition some error, since not everyone can be right. It could be that the As
produced more accurate estimates than the Bs, or indeed the other way around.
Alternatively, both may have produced inaccurate estimates. We also do not
know the direction of any inaccuracy: over- or underestimation. Another issue is
the extent to which the level of actual consensus for a particular position
mediates the eVect. Finally, it should be pointed out that a zero FCE does not
imply no error. Thus, the extent of any bias implied by a FCE requires a
comparison between the estimated consensus and the actual consensus for both
the `As’ and the `Bs’ , so that the level of accuracy can be computed for these two
groups. Alerted to this problem, Mullen and Hu (1988) observed from a meta-
analysis of previous research that the majority signi® cantly underestimates its own
consensus whilst the minority overestimates its own consensus. Moreover, the
minority’s overestimation is substantially greater than the majority’s under-
estimation. This suggests that if the majority’s underestimation and the minority’s
overestimation were of equal size, there would be no FCE. Mullen and Hu (1988)
also found that as the diVerence in the relative size of the majority and the
minority increases, the majority’s tendency to underestimate increases, and the
minority’s tendency to overestimate decreases, resulting in a smaller FCE.
The second point to be made in relation to the falsity implied by a FCE concerns
the rationality of anchoring one’s estimates of others on one’s own position. Hoch
(1987) suggested that the FCE is not necessarily false but may be a special case of
inductive reasoning. The main argument is that one’s own position has diagnostic
value. Having no knowledge, or holding no position, is equivalent to having no
information in which case the best estimate of the proportion `agreeing’ is 50% .
However, since one’s own position constitutes an item of information, one’s
estimated proportion must logically be lower or higher than 50% . Using Bayesian
rules to revise the 50% estimate in the light of this additional information yields a
® gure of 67% , i.e. a f`alse’ consensus of 33% (the FCE of 33% resulting from the
application of Bayesian rules yields an eVect size that is remarkably similar to that
observed in classic studies such as those by Ross et al. in 1977). This analysis implies
that it is a rational (in fact, optimal) strategy for people to assume this degree of
similarity since this will result in more accurate estimates in the long run. This
argument recognizes that single observations have diagnostic value and implies that
only FCEs greater than 33% provide evidence of bias. Dawes (1989) adopts a similar
position that estimating from a sample size of one is a rational strategy, and argues
that its falsity cannot be judged by its simple departure from the actual consensus.
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The strategy may only be considered as false if people placed more weight on their
own response than on that of someone else whose position was known to them.
Thus, from this perspective, the FCE is not necessarily false and need not be
attributed to faulty psychological processes. However, regardless of the rationality
or otherwise of false consensus, the fact remains that people frequently base their
estimates of others on their own position to a greater degree than they sometimes
should across a large variety of attitude issues and behaviours, and for a variety of
motivational and cognitive reasons. Moreover, the phenomenon has important
implications for the way people make sense of their social world and their
subsequent behaviour. The signi® cance of the phenomenon is reinforced by Fiske
and Taylor (1991: 77) who regard the false consensus eVect has having `profound
implications for how people interpret social reality’ .
4.1.3. False consensus and command and control teams: In addition to `hard’ factual
information, many decisions also require social information, by which we mean the
views, interpretations or intended future actions of others. This is particularly true
for team decision-making in command and control situations. For example, in a ® re-
® ghting situation, a ® re chief’ s decision may require knowledge about what actions a
particular ® re-® ghter intends to carry out and the ® re-® ghter may require instruction
from the chief. Under normal conditions, the team members can simply request
details from each other and exchange the necessary information. However, in a
similar way that many real decisions are made with insuYcient `hard’ information,
the same is true of s`ocial’ information. As a consequence of having insuYcient or
possibly no information about some aspect of a target group, team members are
forced to make assumptions, estimates or predictions about these others. Such
judgements concern both how others may interpret a particular item of information
or assess a situation, and what their future actions will be in a given situation.
Whether this takes place at the operational or the strategic level of the team, this is
where false consensus tendencies may be activated.
An item of information may be either insuYcient or lacking. Information is
lacking in team decision-making situations because it is either not possible, or not
practical, to obtain. This may arise for a number of reasons. In the ® re-® ghting
situation, for instance, a communications link may have been severed. The ® re chief
may then have to guess what the ® re-® ghter has done, or intends to do, and the ® re-
® ghter in turn may have to guess what the chief would have instructed. A second
reason is that time pressure may demand immediate action without prior discussion
with other team members. Another possibility is that an open communication link
may not exist at all, for instance between two opposing teams in military situations;
and even if it would be possible, requesting information from others in competitive
situations may be unwise because the knowledge this could impart to others may
jeopardize the team’s goals. Alternatively, an item of information may simply be
judged to be less important than the time needed to acquire it or be too expensive to
obtain.
In other situations however, information may be available, but only in a partial
form. Estimation will thus be required to ®` ll in the gaps’ and with it comes the
possibility of false consensus. For example, the information may be distorted or
unclear, as a result of equipment malfunction or team member stress; or time
pressure may restrict the amount of communication possible. In many of these cases,
whether there is no or only partial information, the cost associated with actually
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obtaining, or trying to obtain, more (or indeed any) information may present a
higher risk to the achievement of the team’s goals than would estimating the
information. The potential for team bias arises from the possibility that individual
team members base their decisions on incorrect assumptions about others as a result
of anchoring their judgements about others on their own position.
Although these cases imply that the team members are aware of information
de® ciencies, they may not perceive any de® ciency at all but nevertheless make
implicit or unconscious estimates of others. For example, a commander may
implicitly predict that an oYcer will carry out a speci® c procedure when faced with,
what he perceives to be, the situation. The situation from the perspective of the
oYcer may look quite diVerent, however. The commander may make such
assumptions despite the availability of an active communications link. Thus the
possibility of false consensus is not necessarily restricted to those situations where
information is either insuYcient, impractical or impossible to obtain. In these
situations, it may not be necessary to make assumptions. Thus, in this case, the
potential for team bias may re¯ ect a failure to check one’s assumptions. In contrast,
where communication is restricted the potential for team bias may re¯ ect an inability
to check one’s assumptions.
The scope for false consensus within command and control situations may be
elaborated by considering the diVerent types of target groups whose behaviour team
members may be required to estimate. These target groups will vary in both their
nature and their size. Members of one’s own team represent an important target
group. A team member may need to estimate, for example, the likelihood that a
colleague has responded correctly or appropriately to a particular situation. Should
the estimate be inaccurate as a result of the team member overestimating the
similarity between self and the target, then any subsequent decisions made on the
basis of this judgement may contribute to, or directly result in, a team decision bias.
In military settings, the opponent represents another important target group on
which estimates may have to be made: a commander’s decision, for example, may be
dependent on an estimation of the likelihood that the enemy will carry out a
particular strategy or react in a particular way. Other teams, either in the same
organization or in an allied organization, constitute a third type of target group.
Where particular units or teams are working together, it may be necessary to make
decisions on the basis of how one anticipates that other teams, or individuals within
those teams, will behave. Such judgements may be aVected by whether the team or
individual has a similar or diVerent function to that of the estimator. An important
question, of course, is whether the potential for the bias, and its consequences for
team performance, is related to target group type. In addition to needing to estimate
the behaviour of various target groups, there are also numerous types of items that
team members may need to make estimates on, e.g. attitudes towards risk, preference
of decision strategy, anticipated behaviour or ability. The extent to which false
consensus within command and control situations is relevant across diVerent
categories of item is yet to be established. In addition, it should be recognized that
the types of items on which estimates are made could conceivably be linked to the
particular target group.
A number of factors may aVect the accuracy of team members’ assumptions
about others. FischhoV and Johnson (1997) suggested that false consensus may arise
when an individual’s mental model of the target group is inaccurate. Both team
structure and the communication patterns within that structure may play a role in
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the development of such mental models and may therefore be related to the accuracy
of team members’ assumptions of others within the team. Within a horizontally
inclined structure, lower hierarchical diVerentiation may promote the development
of more accurate shared mental models and thus reduce the possibility of inaccurate
assumptions being made. The ability for team members to freely communicate may
have a similar eVect. In either case, estimates made of other team members would be
supported by a stronger shared mental model.
Despite limited empirical evidence, there would appear to be considerable scope
and a real possibility for false consensus to occur in teams. Any tendency for false
consensus re¯ ects the extent to which team members are able, or feel the need, to
check their assumptions about others. This has the potential to result in a team
decision bias, which may in turn degrade the performance of the team. Even though
the FCE does not directly address the issue of accuracy, such assumptions will be
inaccurate to varying degrees. Thus, the probability and the extent to which
performance will be aVected are dependent on how inaccurate the assumption was.
This in turn may be a function of numerous factors, such as the target group being
estimated, the type of item being estimated and the task environment in which the
estimate is made. Research ® ndings in non-team situations also suggest that any
degree of false consensus towards a particular target group may be aVected by
whether prior estimates of diVerent target groups were made and the nature of those
groups. The lack of research directed to the issues raised means that one is limited
mainly to conjecture.
The only research that the authors are aware of in which the notion of assumed
similarity has been implicated with teams was carried out by Fiedler (1954). In this
study inter-personal assumptions of similarity among the members of student
surveyor teams were correlated with the team’s eVectiveness. The results indicated
that the most eVective teams were those in which the most preferred member of a
particular team perceived his team members to be relatively dissimilar. Fiedler
suggested that members of eVective teams use a basis diVerent from that of members
of ineVective teams for choosing and rejecting others as team members. This of
course has implications for selecting or recruiting teams. While the teams involved
were not of a command and control variety, the study nevertheless demonstrates that
the issue of assumed similarity has implications for team performance.
This is a research area that clearly requires much more attention over a number
of areas. The ® rst concerns the extent to which false consensus, and social projection
more generally, occurs in command and control teams and the factors that aVect the
strength of this tendency. The second concerns the accuracy of those assumptions
generated from social projection. The third concerns the extent to which existing
theories of social projection are valid in team environments and the fourth is the
relationship between social projection and team performance.
4.2. Groupthink
One of the most well-known biases occurring in groups is groupthink . A concept
developed by Irving Janis in the early 1970s, groupthink refers to a tendency for
groups to produce poorly reasoned decisions and is described by Janis (1972: 9) as
follows:
a mode of thinking that people engage in when they are deeply involved in a
cohesive in-group, when the members’ striving for unanimity overrides their
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motivation to realistically appraise alternative courses of action. . . .Groupthink
refers to a deterioration of mental efficiency, reality testing, and moral
judgement that results from in-group pressures.
Groups vulnerable to groupthink are more concerned with reaching consensus than
with how it is formed. In general, groupthink is described by Kleindorfer et al. (1993)
as occurring when the desire to be eYcient or to not rock the boat becomes more
important than the quality of the decision itself. The speci® c symptoms of
groupthink include the illusion of invulnerability, strong pressures to conform and
stereotyping people outside the group (Janis 1972). Such manifestations in turn lead
to a number of symptoms of defective decision-making, such as the incomplete
survey of alternatives, consideration of too few objectives and poor information
search (Janis and Mann 1977).
Janis (Janis and Mann 1977, Janis 1982) developed his theory from an analysis of
a number of actual political decisions and argued that groupthink contributed to
several disastrous episodes in US foreign policy, such as the failure to defend Pearl
Harbour from Japanese air attack in 1941. The Bay of Pigs ® asco in 1961, described
below, is another example. In 1959, Castro’s left wing government came to power in
Cuba. His nationalization of American-owned property led the US government,
under the leadership of John F. Kennedy, to develop a plan to invade Cuba. The
plan that Kennedy and his advisors developed involved landing Cuban exiles at the
Bay of Pigs. If the plan was unsuccessful, the invaders were to retreat to the
Escambray Mountains where it was known that anti-Castro guerrillas were located.
Incredibly, nobody noticed that there were 80 miles of impenetrable swamp between
the landing point and the mountains. It actually transpired that the plan was so
badly conceived that the entire force was virtually wiped out before an attempt could
even be made to implement the retreat plan. Moreover, news of the surprise invasion
had also been leaked, and was printed a number of days before in the New York
Times. Kennedy’ s reaction after the ® asco was `How could we have been so stupid?’
In all such cases however, the decisions were made by cohesive groups where
disagreement and criticism were suppressed in order to preserve group solidarity.
The concept of groupthink has proved to be extremely valuable both practically
and academically, and has attracted widespread interest in the ® elds of management,
law and medicine. While acceptance of the groupthink phenomenon has become
almost universal (Aldag and Riggs Fuller 1993), there are problems with both the
theory and the methodology used to assess the phenomenon. The retrospective case
study approach used by Janis (1982) has, for example, been the subject of numerous
criticisms (Tetlock 1979). Some researchers have argued that the theory itself lacks
many aspects of group decision-making known to be important, e.g. group
polarization (Whyte 1989). There have also been suggestions that the theory neglects
a number of potentially important variables, including: group norms (Moorhead
1982), leader power (McCauley 1989), task characteristics (Callaway and Esser 1984)
and the stage of group development (Leana 1985). Other researchers have drawn
attention to a number of unclearly speci® ed relationships among those variables that
are de® ned in the theory (Longley and Pruitt 1980, Steiner 1982). Furthermore, the
generalizability of groupthink is potentially limited since it was designed speci® cally
to address major group decisions made by highly cohesive groups in political and
military contexts. Overall, critics suggest that the groupthink concept is incomplete,
restrictive in its scope and lacks precision in a number of key aspects.
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A further issue of concern for groupthink is that most experimental research has
involved only partial tests of the theory, with results that have oVered only mixed
support. While most support for groupthink has come from case studies, this
approach is subject to the same methodological criticisms as Janis’ s approach (1982).
Experimental studies have provided less convincing support, however. For example,
most indicate that group cohesiveness, hypothesized by Janis (1982) to be the major
antecedent factor, does not aVect groupthink (Park 1990). The mixed empirical
support may be in part due to the numerous methodological diYculties faced by
researchers. It is therefore premature to discount altogether the groupthink concept,
and even though the theory itself may be incomplete, it has provided researchers with
an important basis for a revised theory of defective group decision-making (Aldag
and Riggs Fuller 1993).
4.2.1. Underlying psychological mechanismsÐ groupthink from a mental model
perspective: FischhoV and Johnson (1997) suggested that a psychological concept
underlying groupthink (and indeed other group biases) is the notion of shared mental
models. These may be de® ned as common knowledge structures held by members of
a group. For the individual, a mental model allows perceived phenomena to be
explained. However, a mental model will inevitably represent an incomplete view of
the world. Given the assumption that the mental model of each group member is
capable of explaining a speci® c subset of observed phenomena, then the higher the
degree to which members’ mental models are shared, the lower the explanatory
power (or completeness) of the combined model. Even in the absence of pressures to
conform, it has been suggested that a signi® cant overlap of group members’ mental
models may lead them to think similarlyÐ but incorrectlyÐ whilst at the same time
bolstering their con® dence in their positions. Thus group members united by a
shared mental model are hypothesized to be especially vulnerable to groupthink.
Alternatively, when there is no shared mental model among the group members, the
combined mental model would represent a less inaccurate view of the world, and this
is argued to reduce the risk of groupthink. However, in such situations, the disparity
in beliefs, knowledge and experience would create diVerent problems. In practice,
models will be neither completely shared nor completely independent.
FischhoV and Johnson (1997) suggested that where groupthink occurs, there is
only a perception of completely shared models. In other words, mental models do
not in reality completely overlap; this in principle moderates the eVects of
groupthink. However, this situation introduces additional problems. For example,
group members may use particular words or terms (such as r`isk’ , t`hreat’ or
l`ikelihood’) under the assumption that the other group members attach the same
meaning to such terms, when in actual fact this is not necessarily the case. While
such discrepancies in understanding may appear to be subtle, they may be signi® cant
enough to induce unrecognized drift in the group members’ mental models, which
may ultimately result in unpredictable group decisions.
4.2.2. Conditions that invite groupthink: According to Janis (1982) , groupthink
occurs in moderate to highly cohesive groups when certain secondary antecedent
conditions are present; these include strong directive leadership, time pressure, and
the importance and complexity of the decision. Group cohesion, however, is
hypothesized as being the primary condition and refers to the overall strength of
positive relationships within the group (Baron et al. 1993). Put more simply, a
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cohesive group is one whose members know each other well and like each other.
Important conditions favourable to cohesion include similar norms, attitudes and
shared experiences. Small team size has also been suggested as a contributory factor
(McGrath 1984). Furthermore, Noorderhaven (1995) indicated that group cohesion
could be bolstered in situations where group membership allows individuals to
achieve their own personal goals or provides a level of status suYcient for members
to accept the pressures to conform to group norms. Noorderhaven (1995) also
suggested that the level of cohesion may be augmented when group members have
speci® c work-related goals that are relevant and compatible with that of the whole
group. Physical proximity has been found to be another factor that promotes
cohesion (Sundstrom 1986). Contextual factors likely to foster cohesion include
external pressure (Glickman et al. 1987) and rewards for team performance (Shea
and Guzzo 1987).
Another dimension related to the level of cohesiveness is the degree of familiarity
among team members. Familiarity could arise because the team is in an advanced
stage of development or because the roles of the team members demand frequent
interaction. It seems plausible that a highly familiar group would be more likely to
be cohesive than one that is not. If this were true, the level of group familiarity
would have a role to play in groupthink. However, Leana (1985) argued that
unfamiliar groups, whilst lacking cohesion, may be susceptible to groupthink
symptoms because of insecurity concerning member roles and group norms.
Cohesive groups (to the extent that they are familiar) on the other hand, may exhibit
far fewer symptoms of defective decision-making than groupthink would suggest
because members are secure enough in their roles and status to challenge one
another, but have well developed methods of reaching agreement (Aldag and Riggs
Fuller 1993).
4.2.3. Groupthink and command and control teams: Groupthink, as originally
conceived by Janis (1972), is a theory of defective decision-making in groups faced
with major decisions in political and military contexts. Since the theory refers
speci® cally to groups, one may question its relevance to teams (although the decision
context is at least consistent with military command and control teams). To the
authors’ knowledge no research has tested the validity of groupthink at a team level.
However since empirical support is mixed even at a group level, the extent to which
groupthink can be generalized to teams is questionable.
Sundstrom et al. (1990: 127) suggested that group biases such as groupthink may
be more prevalent in autonomous groups, `especially high ranking teams who make
decisions with little outside help’ . It is argued that this stems from their greater
reliance on internal group processes. Such groups typically operate in parallel to the
central activities of the organization. Examples include task forces, committees and
project teams. Conversely, it is argued that teams that are more integrated with the
central activities of the organization on the other hand (e.g. command and control
teams) will be less liable to groupthink. Sundstrom’s suggestion (Sundstrom et al.
1990: 127) is also supported by the argument that the functional division of team
tasks may foster a diverse set of mental models amongst its members that may in
turn reduce the potential for groupthink. While plausible, limited empirical support
exists for this hypothesis.
However, many of the factors hypothesized to contribute to group cohesion (and
furthermore the secondary factors themselves) are consistent with the characteristics
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of command and control teams. On the basis of this match, one could expect
command and control teams to be cohesive and liable to groupthink in discussion-
orientated team activities, although this alone may not be suYcient for groupthink to
occur. However, group cohesiveness may be linked to other aspects of command and
control teams. For example, the hierarchical and disciplined environment typical of
many command and control teams may foster an unwillingness to disturb any
perceived cohesion and may inhibit team members from oVering information
thought to be unusual, but which could be highly relevant to the team decision.
Stasser and Titus (1987) found that group members tend to oVer information already
shared by the group rather than novel information, thereby preserving group
cohesion. Overall, the potential for groupthink in teams is unclear. However, it
would be premature to underestimate the potential for groupthink, or indeed a
variant of groupthink, to occur in team decision-making.
4.3. Group polarization
Group polarization refers to the phenomenon that occurs when the position that is
held on an issue by the majority of the group members is intensi® ed as a result of
discussion (Lamm 1988). For example, the theory would predict that if group
members are initially generally in favour of a particular preference, then group
discussion will further enhance the favourability of this preference at an individual
level.
There are two special cases of group polarization. One is termed risky shift and
occurs when a group, overall, becomes more risk seeking than the initial average risk
seeking tendencies of the individual members. The other is termed cautious shift and
occurs when groups become more risk averse than the initial average risk averse
tendencies of the individual members. In both cases the average response of the
individual group members is more extreme after discussion. Such shifts in preference
have been demonstrated by an overwhelming number of studies. Among other
things, the eVect has been demonstrated for attitudes towards issues such as war,
capital punishment, judgements of facts and the perception of people. For detailed
reviews of the literature see Lamm and Myers (1978) or Isenberg (1986).
4.3.1. Underlying psychological mechanismsÐ theories of group polarization: There
are two main theories of group polarization: social comparison theory and persuasive
arguments theory. According to the social comparison theory, group polarization
stems from people’s motivation to be perceived, and to present themselves, in a
favourable light. Through a process of comparison with others, individuals
endeavour to present themselves in a way that they perceive to be more favourable
than the average position, i.e. more extreme than the group mean but in the majority
direction. This allows an individual to feel both similar to the group and distinctive
in the approved direction. When each member of a group is engaging in such a
process of comparison, the result is a shift in the direction of greater perceived social
value. There are two variations of this theory, one emphasizing pluralistic ignorance
and the other emphasizing one-upmanship (Isenberg 1986). The persuasive
arguments theory emphasizes an informational in¯ uence and states that polarization
is a function of the number and the persuasiveness of the arguments presented.
Burnstein (1982) argued that the persuasiveness of an argument is determined by its
perceived validity and its novelty. However, since the majority position is more likely
to be represented, an individual is more exposed to the arguments favouring the view
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of the majority, causing that individual to shift in that direction. The review of the
literature by Isenberg (1986) indicates that there is substantial empirical support for
both theories. While on balance the research probably favours the informational
perspective, it is likely that an interaction of both processes mediate group
polarization.
The relative in¯ uence of one process over another is likely to be contingent on the
nature of the group and the decision situation, although there remain a number of
unanswered research questions in this area. Kaplan (1987) suggested that the two
processes appeal to two diVerent aspects of human functioning (emotive and
cognitive) and argued that the extent to which one or the other of the processes is
likely to be in¯ uential is dependent on the group/problem interaction. If the
interaction within the group is predominantly of a socio-emotional nature, a social
comparison in¯ uence is more important. Task orientated interaction, on the other
hand, is more strongly associated with an informational in¯ uence. As far as the
nature of task is concerned, Kaplan (1987) suggests that a social comparison
in¯ uence is likely to be relatively important for tasks of a judgmental or subjective
nature (e.g. is the stock market morally defensible?), whereas an informational
in¯ uence is likely to dominate more intellectual or objective tasks (e.g. choice of
investment plans on the stock market).
4.3.2. Conditions that invite group polarization: Group polarization is induced from
the process of group discussion. However, the potential for polarization exists only if
the initial view of the individual group members is in the same direction. The eVect
also appears to be con® ned to relatively important decisions. If the issue is
suYciently unimportant, group depolarization can occur where the average position
is less extreme after discussion (Kerr 1992). However, the literature says little about
more speci® c conditions under which a shift will or will not occur and the factors
aVecting the relative magnitude of a shift. The extent to which polarization eVects
are domain speci® c is also unclear. Thus, there remain a number of outstanding
questions regarding the relationship between the magnitude of polarization and the
characteristics of both the decision situation and the group.
4.3.3. Group polarization and command and control teams: Group polarization is a
bias emanating speci® cally from group discussion and may therefore have little
relevance for team task execution per se. However, the bias may be highly relevant in
command and control teams to the extent that the members engage in discussion
orientated activities, e.g. over tactical or strategic/planning issues. The literature says
little, however, about how tendencies towards polarization may be aVected by
factors relevant to command and control situations, such as time pressure, level of
uncertainty and information incompleteness.
4.4. Group escalation of commitment
Escalation of commitment refers to the tendency for individuals or groups to
continue to support a course of action despite evidence that it is failing. In other
words, it is the tendency for a decision to support a previous decision for which there
was a negative outcome. Since such behaviour may not, up to a point, be necessarily
irrational, the speci® c concern is with non-rational escalation of commitment,
de® ned by Bazerman (1994: 79) as t`he degree to which an individual escalates
commitment to a previously selected course of action beyond that which a rational
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model of decision making would prescribe’ . (This de® nition is also assumed to extend
to the group case.)
Staw (1976) was the ® rst to demonstrate escalation in a study that required
subjects to allocate a second stream of research and development funds to a
hypothetical company division following the initial decision to invest three years
ago. Subjects were either responsible for the initial investment or not. When the
outcome of the initial decision was negative, those individuals responsible for that
decision subsequently allocated more funds to that course of action than did those
who were not responsible for the initial decision. Since then, the tendency to escalate
commitment has been demonstrated by many studies across numerous domains
including interpersonal relations, waiting situations, gambling, economic investment
and policy-making. While there seems to be little doubt as to the prevalence and
diversity of tendencies to escalate commitment, research in this area has tended to
focus at an individual level (i.e. independent of social context).
Departing from this trend, the studies by Bazerman et al. (1984) and Whyte
(1993) have demonstrated escalation tendencies at a group level. Interestingly, while
Bazerman et al. (1984) found no evidence that groups escalate commitment more
than individuals, Whyte’ s (1993) ® ndings indicated that in terms of both frequency
and severity, there was a greater tendency for groups to escalate commitment. The
inconsistency of these ® ndings suggests that the extent to which individuals and
groups diVer in their relative tendencies to escalate commitment is likely to be
contingent on other factors.
However, both the groupthink and the group polarization literature support
Whyte’ s (1993) ® nding that groups escalate more than individuals. First, from a
groupthink perspective, given that a majority view is suYcient to induce any
dissenters to conform to a decision to escalate, reliance on a group rather than an
individual to resolve an escalation dilemma will increase the frequency with which
escalation occurs in groups as opposed to individuals (Whyte 1993). Second, drawing
on the ® ndings of r`isky shift’ indicating that groups make riskier decisions than
individuals, since the decision to escalate can be viewed as risk seeking, one could
hypothesize that groups escalate more than individuals. As far as teams are
concerned, however, no research to date has investigated the potential for escalation.
4.4.1. Underlying psychological mechanismsÐ theories and explanations of escalation
of commitment: Staw (1976) concluded that the mechanism underlying escalation in
individuals is a cognitive dissonance (Festinger 1957) or self-justi ® cation (Aronson
1972). That is, escalation is an attempt to make previous behaviour appear rational.
This could be interpreted as a way of demonstrating to others that one’s previous
decision was not a mistake (i.e. s`aving face’ ). At an individual level, several studies
have demonstrated that self-justi® cation motives contribute to escalation (Staw and
Fox 1977, Bazerman et al. 1982, Ross and Staw 1986).
At a group level, on the other hand, Whyte (1993) suggested that self-justi® catory
motives are likely to be of reduced importance, pointing to studies such as that of
Mynatt and Sherman (1975), which indicates that group members experience less
personal responsibility for the actions of the group than they experience for their
own individual behaviour. However, the strength of this argument is weakened when
applied to teams, where the members are mutually dependent on each other. Whyte’ s
(1993) argument is challenged further by Bazerman et al. (1984) who provided strong
evidence that dissonance processes may also be important at a group level.
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A second theory oVered for both group and individual escalation of commitment
is based on Prospect Theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). Central to the theory is
the notion that risk-taking behaviour is dependent on whether the decision is
positively or negatively framed, i.e. whether the perceived choice is one between
certain/uncertain gains or one between certain/uncertain losses. In terms of
escalation, negative outcome information on a previous decision represents a
negatively framed decision situation; that is, the choice is one between certain and
uncertain losses. Under such circumstances, prospect theory predicts that people
prefer the risky option. This choice is consistent with a tendency to escalate.
However, there is no uni® ed explanation. Both theoretical views are able to
account for speci® cally observed incidences of escalation. The validity of each theory
may therefore be contingent upon the speci® c circumstances in which escalation
occurs. Although it is unlikely that either theory is capable of providing a complete
account of group escalation, they can be viewed as being complementary as opposed
to competitive.
4.4.2. Conditions that invite escalation of commitment: A dissonance explanation
predicts that escalation will be greater in situations where a decision to escalate is
made by the same group that was responsible for the initial decision that is now
failing. This was supported by the research ® ndings of Bazerman et al. (1984). Whyte
(1993) however suggested that responsibility is not a necessary condition for
inappropriate escalation. The prospect theory explanation, on the other hand,
suggests that the conditions that invoke the framing of decision outcomes are the
important determinants.
A number of other studies suggest additional situations where escalation
tendencies may be more pronounced. For example, Staw and Ross (1978) showed
that the tendency to escalate was greater when an explanation could be developed for
the initial failure that showed the outcome to be beyond the control of the decision
maker(s). Similarly, Schwenk (1984) showed that escalation is strongest if the cause
of the failure is attributed to external events as opposed to any fault in the policy, per
se. Bazerman et al. (1980) found that the tendency to escalate was signi® cantly
aVected by three factors: the degree of disappointment felt by the decision maker
when the negative feedback was provided; the perceived importance of the decision;
and the perceived relationship between the two decisions. Finally, the connection
between escalation and groupthink as discussed above suggests that a more cohesive
group would be more prone to escalation than one that was not.
4.4.3. Group escalation of commitment and command and control teams: Individual
escalation of commitment has obvious relevance for command and control teams to
the extent that its members have personal responsibility for speci® c decisions. The
issue of leadership skills is also a relevant issue here. In no other situation is good
leadership, both actual and as perceived by the team members, more important than
where people’ s lives are at stake. Escalating commitment can be argued to
demonstrate consistency and is a quality shown by Staw and Ross (1980) to be
one that people associate with good leadership. To the extent that commanders
perceive this to be the case, the price for demonstrating consistency may be extreme
and unparalleled with that in other teams.
However, the potential for group escalation of commitment in teams is, as with
groupthink and group polarization, likely to be more closely associated with
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discussion orientated activities as opposed to the execution of team tasks themselves.
The relevance of group escalation in command and control situations is therefore
likely to be restricted to those situations where there is organized or formal
discussion between team members, e.g. on strategic, planning or tactical issues.
There are, however, a number of situational conditions speci® c to command and
control teams that may interact with a tendency to escalate (e.g. time pressure and
level of certainty) although such relationships currently amount to conjecture and
remain a question for further research.
A special case of escalation, which is especially relevant to command and control
teams, occurs in competitive situations. This variant involves two parties engaged in
a battle of some kind and has obvious parallels to a military combat situation. A
price war scenario provides a particularly good illustration of this form of escalation.
Here, two companies successively reduce the price of their product in response to the
price reductions of their competitor. At a certain stage the respective parties enter
into a `no win’ situation, but they both continue to escalate despite the heavy losses
that each is incurring. In such situations the desire to win represents a very powerful
additional motivation to escalate. The price war between American Airlines and
Northwest Airlines in 1992 is illustrative of this type of escalation. The rationality of
engaging in such a `war’ is contingent on one’s estimation of the probability of the
opponent pulling out. While in a military context there may be other in¯ uences and
factors at stake, the message is that situations that may look like opportunities may
prove to be traps. In other domains, where the `enemy’ is either not human (e.g. ® re)
or under the direct control of humans, the relevance of competitive escalation is
unclear.
5. Summary and conclusions
This paper has reviewed four important social contextual and group biases that are
likely to be relevant to team decision-making in command and control situations.
For each bias the authors discussed its descriptive nature, its in¯ uencing factors and
underlying psychological mechanisms, and how it may arise in command and
control situations. The analysis suggests that these biases have a strong potential to
aVect team decision-making performance and may arise in a number of diVerent
situations, at both strategic and operational levels of the team. As part of the
analysis the author discussed the somewhat t`ricky’ distinction between teams and
groups, culminating in something of a paradox in which teams may be regarded as a
subset of groups whereas group decision-making may be regarded as a subset of
team decision-making. Nevertheless, the authors believe that some progress has been
made in clarifying these terms. The discussion is complemented with an attempt to
de® ne, as oppose to characterize, a command and control team.
As part of the main discussion, a distinction was made between those biases
emanating from social projection (i.e. assuming similarity with others) and those
emanating from social in¯ uential factors (traditionally known as `group biases’ ).
One way of looking at these two categories of biases is to regard them respectively as
non-discussion based and discussion based social biases. Biases emanating from
social projection, namely false consensus, may arise when team members need to
make estimates about others, either within or outside the immediate team. For
instance, a team member’s decision may require making an judgement about the
future intended actions of another team member when such information is
unavailable or impractical to access, owing to time pressure or a failure in the
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lines of communication. Biases emanating from social in¯ uential factors (i.e.
groupthink, group polarization and group escalation of commitment) would appear
to be, not surprisingly, highly relevant for decision-making made at higher levels of
the organization on issues of strategy or planning. To the extent that these decisions
® lter through to the team level, they will have an important and direct impact on
team decision-making behaviour. However, it also seems plausible that such biases
may arise directly at the level of the team whenever its members engage in discussion
as part of collective, but localized, decision-making processes.
It is conceivable that some biases have more potential to aVect team decision-
making than others do. Moreover, the speci® c features and task environments of
command and control teams suggest that diVerent types of team may be aVected in
diVerent ways and to varying degrees. Although this is a question for future research,
biases in command and control teams more generally appear to be promoted by
decisions that are important or novel, and where high levels of uncertainty exist.
Time pressure and team cohesion are also likely to be important factors. All of these
conditions are consistent with those of command and control teams. In terms of the
underlying source of team biases, FischhoV and Johnson (1997) suggested that a
useful unifying concept is that of a shared mental model.
As a ® nal comment, it should be stressed that most research on decision biases
has focused on the individual level and the group level. While of undoubted
relevance to team decision-making, research on decision biases by teams per se
remains comparatively limited, and the research that has been conducted has
adopted the traditional cognitive perspective with the social cognitive elements being
largely neglected. Nevertheless, an important initial research objective would be to
empirically assess the potential for both cognitive and social biases at both the
operational and strategic levels of teams. It is also important to gain a better
understanding of how situational factors relevant to command and control (e.g.
uncertainty, information incompleteness, and time stress) interact with these biases.
A more radical requirement, however, is for decision research to direct more of its
eVort towards those biases which are unique to teams with the aim of gaining an
insight into the impact of such biases, the conditions under which they arise and their
underlying cause. Within such an agenda, the current cognitive emphasis should be
complemented by additional emphasis on the social side of cognition. If something
like false consensus is described as having `profound implications for how people
interpret social reality’ (Fiske and Taylor 1991: 77), it may also have some important
implications for teams.
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